Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941

Eric Arneson from George Washington University opens the session of the Washington History Seminar, co-chaired by Philippa Strom from the Woodrow Wilson Center. The seminar is a joint venture between the Woodrow Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program and the American Historical Association's National History Center. Arneson thanks various sponsors, including the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, George Washington University's History Department, and the Kennan Institute. He then hands over to Philippa Strom, who introduces the speaker, Stephen Kotkin, detailing his extensive academic background and notable publications.

Stephen Kotkin is introduced as a renowned historian from Princeton University, author of numerous books including a trilogy on Stalin. The first volume, 'Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928,' was a Pulitzer Prize finalist. Kotkin humorously begins by acknowledging the complexity of discussing his extensive book 'Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941' in a short talk. He outlines his plan to cover a few key aspects, focusing first on the personal characteristics and ideological convictions of Stalin.

Kotkin discusses the challenge of portraying figures like Stalin, who are often dismissed as either mediocre or portrayed as evil geniuses. He emphasizes that Stalin was neither mediocre nor a genius but was complex, shrewd, and ideological. He highlights Stalin's personal quirks, such as his love for gardening, saunas, and colored pencils, as well as his meticulous habits. Kotkin aims to humanize Stalin to better understand the roots of his actions, which makes his evil deeds more complex and compelling.

Kotkin shifts to discuss Stalin's foreign policy and geopolitical strategies. He explains the interwar period's complexities, noting how the Versailles Treaty created an anomalous situation with Germany and Russia both being weak. Stalin's foreign policy aimed to prevent a unified capitalist front against the Soviet Union by driving wedges between capitalist powers. This strategy was evident in Stalin's maneuvering during the Rapallo Treaty and other diplomatic efforts.

Kotkin elaborates on the British efforts to revise the Versailles Treaty to stabilize Europe and include Germany and possibly the Soviet Union in a post-war settlement. He contrasts this with Stalin's consistent strategy to keep capitalist powers divided to avoid an anti-Soviet coalition. He describes how Stalin's policies were driven by a blend of ideological and pragmatic considerations, aimed at preserving the Soviet Union's security and promoting potential revolutions in other countries.

Focusing on the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Kotkin argues that the pact was a strategic move by Stalin to prevent a unified capitalist front against the Soviet Union. He recounts how Stalin navigated the complex negotiations and initial mistrust, using the example of the German forces crossing into Soviet-claimed Polish territory to illustrate the tensions and Stalin's strategic responses. He emphasizes that Stalin never trusted Hitler, viewing the pact as a temporary measure to gain time and resources.

Kotkin continues with the intricate details of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, highlighting incidents where mistrust was evident, such as the German forces encroaching on Soviet territory. He explains how Stalin's strategic moves, like sending the Red Army to reclaim territory, demonstrated his awareness of potential German duplicity. This part of the pact narrative underscores the fraught nature of Soviet-German relations despite the formal agreement.

Kotkin delves into the real history behind the Hitler-Stalin Pact, debunking myths that Stalin trusted Hitler. He describes the strategic and cautious approach Stalin took, including his response to German forces overstepping agreed boundaries. This section highlights the ongoing tension and strategic maneuvering that defined Soviet-German interactions during the pact's implementation.

Kotkin discusses British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's perspective on dealing with Stalin, emphasizing Chamberlain's concern about the long-term consequences of allying with the Soviet Union against Hitler. This concern foreshadowed the Cold War dynamics, where the post-war world saw significant Soviet influence in Central Europe. Kotkin uses this to illustrate the complex decisions faced by world leaders in balancing immediate threats with future geopolitical stability.

Kotkin examines the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland, detailing Stalin's attempts to negotiate territorial adjustments for security reasons. He highlights Stalin's unexpected willingness to negotiate and make concessions, contrasting it with Finnish distrust and constitutional limitations. The war is portrayed as a significant episode that tested Stalin's strategic thinking and revealed the complexities of Soviet-Finnish relations.

Kotkin explores the military aspects of the Winter War, emphasizing Stalin's initial miscalculations and the Red Army's poor performance due to flawed strategies. He recounts how Stalin's personal interventions negatively impacted the Soviet military plans and the eventual adjustments that led to Soviet victory. This section underscores Stalin's limitations as a military leader and the significant human cost of his strategic errors.

Kotkin concludes with a broader analysis of Stalin's dictatorship, arguing that Stalin's political experience and the process of accumulating power shaped his personality and actions. He refutes simplistic explanations that attribute Stalin's behavior to early life experiences, instead highlighting the sophisticated and brutal nature of his governance. Kotkin's analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the factors that molded Stalin into a formidable dictator.

In response to a question, Kotkin discusses Stalin's perception of the United States. He notes Stalin's admiration for American industrial power and modernity, as well as his strategic interest in technology transfer. Kotkin explains how Stalin's attempts to engage with the U.S. were driven by both economic and geopolitical considerations, including the need to balance against Japanese expansion in East Asia.

Responding to another question, Kotkin elaborates on the mutual distrust between Hitler and Stalin. He details the strategic calculations that led to the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the subsequent actions by both leaders that reflected their opportunistic and tactical approaches. Kotkin emphasizes the temporary and fragile nature of the pact, driven by immediate strategic needs rather than genuine trust or long-term alliance.

Addressing a query on the Popular Front, Kotkin explains how Stalin's commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology influenced his geopolitical strategies. He argues that Stalin viewed the Popular Front more as a tactical maneuver rather than a genuine ideological shift. Kotkin highlights the inherent tensions within the leftist movements and Stalin's pragmatic approach to exploiting these divisions while maintaining his broader ideological goals.

In response to a bibliographical question, Kotkin recommends several key works on Stalin, both from Western and Russian scholars. He highlights the contributions of authors like Montefiore, Ostrovsky, and others who have provided valuable insights into Stalin's life and regime. Kotkin also acknowledges the evolving nature of research on Stalin, with new documents and perspectives continually enriching the field.

Kotkin addresses the impact of Stalin's early life on his later behavior, arguing against simplistic explanations that focus on childhood trauma or mistreatment. He emphasizes that Stalin's actions as a dictator were shaped more by his political experiences and the demands of maintaining power. Kotkin's analysis challenges the notion that early life experiences alone can explain the complexities of Stalin's character and actions.

Kotkin summarizes his argument that Stalin's personality and actions were largely shaped by the process of building and maintaining his dictatorship. He emphasizes the sophisticated and often brutal methods Stalin used to consolidate power and manage the Soviet state. This concluding section reinforces the idea that Stalin's dictatorship was a complex and evolving system influenced by various political and personal factors.

Kotkin briefly touches on the relationship between Stalin and Roosevelt, hinting at the complexities that will be covered in his forthcoming volume. He suggests that Stalin's respect for Roosevelt was influenced by the perceived power and modernity of the United States, and the potential for strategic cooperation against common enemies like Nazi Germany and Japan. Kotkin promises a more detailed exploration of this topic in his next book.