Britain in the 20th Century: "Appeasement" - Professor Vernon Bogdanor

The speaker addresses the audience, acknowledging the delay in covering the 20th century within the lecture series. They have reached 1931 and plan to cover up to 1945 in the upcoming lectures, with a more detailed postwar period to follow in the next year. The lecture will particularly focus on the national government, its formation under a Labor prime minister who was considered a renegade, and its challenges, predominantly in foreign policy, facing three totalitarian dictatorships.

The speaker discusses the harsh judgment by historians of the British governments led by Ramsey McDonald, Stanley Baldwin, and Neville Chamberlain. These governments are criticized for not preparing Britain for war and their policies of appeasement. The speaker reflects on the political impact on post-war Britain, leading to the election of the first majority Labour government and the repudiation of the Conservative party. The speaker also touches on the role of hindsight in judging these governments and the public support for appeasement policies at the time.

The speaker delves into the belief that Hitler might become more moderate if German grievances were addressed peacefully. They discuss the difficulty of envisioning the scale of atrocities like the Holocaust during a perceived civilized era. The speaker also highlights the bias in historical narratives, such as Churchill's memoirs, which have shaped the perspective on the 1930s governments. The influence of these memoirs on historians and the public is examined, along with the lack of memoirs from the prime ministers of the 1930s.

The speaker explains how the inclusion of the Labour party and trade unions into the government during the war contributed to their respectability and eventual election win in 1945. The speaker contrasts the public's fear of another war with the political strategies of the time, including Churchill's ill-judged speech about the potential need for a gestapo under a socialist government. The emotional impact of World War I on Britain and the desire to avoid further conflict is also discussed.

The speaker outlines the post-World War I efforts to prevent future wars, including the creation of the League of Nations and the concept of collective security. They discuss the American isolationist stance and the lack of power within the League due to America's absence. The disarmament policies of Britain and America in the 1920s and early 1930s are also covered, as well as the criticism of the national government for not disarming.

The speaker details the rearmament efforts of the British government in the 1930s, emphasizing decisions made by Neville Chamberlain to focus on the Royal Air Force and radar technology rather than a large army. The economic considerations behind these decisions are explored, along with the political debate over conscription and the size of the army. The speaker also mentions the small British army on the Western Front in May 1940 and the lack of support for conscription in peacetime.

The speaker describes the British policy under Chamberlain as one of self-defense, with a focus on protecting the empire rather than engaging in European conflicts. The imperialist perspective of the time is highlighted, with Britain's focus on maintaining its global empire. The speaker also touches on the debate over whether Britain is a European country and the differing views of Churchill and Chamberlain on this matter.

The speaker recounts Churchill's opposition to Indian self-rule and his subsequent resignation from the Conservative Shadow Cabinet. Churchill's campaign against the National Government's policy on India is detailed, along with his comparison of Gandhi to Hitler. The speaker also discusses the perception of Churchill's judgment and political missteps during the 1930s, which contributed to his image as a reactionary figure.

The speaker provides a nuanced view of the Munich Agreement, highlighting that it was not a policy of a single individual but a collective decision made by the cabinet. The speaker discusses Chamberlain's rationale, the Chiefs of Staff's view on Britain's readiness for war, and the public opinion's role in influencing government decisions. The principle of self-determination for the Sudetenland is also explored, along with Chamberlain's belief in Hitler's assurances.

The speaker discusses the principle of self-determination as a key factor in the Munich Agreement and the British Cabinet's decision not to go to war over the issue. The complexities of the situation in Czechoslovakia, including ethnic divisions and treaties with France and the Soviet Union, are outlined. The speaker also touches on the British fear of being dragged into war due to alliances and the eventual agreement that led to the Munich Conference.

The speaker narrates Chamberlain's journey to Munich for the historical conference, highlighting his intentions and the诗句引用 from亨利四世。 The speaker also discusses the perceptions of British and French actions as signs of weakness by Hitler and Mussolini, and the broader context of the European political landscape at the time. The misunderstandings surrounding the Munich Agreement and its implications for the subsequent path to war are also examined.