Jessica Wilson: The Emergence of Ordinary Objects

The speaker introduces the concept of vertical and horizontal progress within academic disciplines. Vertical progress refers to the development of a field based on its foundational presuppositions, akin to normal science, ensuring internal consistency and coherence with other theories. Horizontal progress, however, involves exploring different frameworks or sets of assumptions. The speaker notes the acceptance of multiple frameworks in fields like art and mathematics but points out the ongoing debate in metaphysics and physics regarding the validity of various frameworks and the belief in a single correct understanding of reality.

This section delves into the conundrum of multiple metaphysical frameworks and the belief in a singular reality. The speaker suggests two potential resolutions: one is an anti-realist stance, where there is no factual basis to reality, and the other is an agnostic position, where we acknowledge the possibility of not being able to reconcile different perspectives. The speaker leans towards the idea that we are not yet at the end of methodological inquiry and that there is a lack of consensus on what would make a metaphysical theory correct.

The speaker addresses the challenge of metaphysical emergence, discussing how special science entities exhibit both dependence on lower-level entities and a degree of autonomy. They introduce the concept of 'metaphysical emergence' as a way to explain how higher-level entities can have distinct ontological and causal properties despite their dependence. The speaker also touches on the potential incompatibility of these ideas with reductionist and eliminativist views.

This paragraph explores the arguments against metaphysical emergence, particularly focusing on Jaegwon Kim's over-determination argument. Kim's argument is based on the premise that special science entities are dependent on lower-level physical entities, yet distinct and efficacious. The speaker outlines the promises underlying Kim's argument and how rejecting each promise corresponds to different comprehensive views on natural reality, such as substance dualism, eliminationism, and robust emergentism.

The speaker presents two strategies to address over-determination in the context of metaphysical emergence: strong emergence and weak emergence. Strong emergence suggests that higher-level entities possess fundamentally new powers, while weak emergence posits that these entities have a proper subset of the powers of lower-level entities. The speaker argues that these strategies can accommodate the intuitions of metaphysical emergence and are compatible with scientific naturalism.

In this section, the speaker discusses the distinctive efficacy of higher-level entities, suggesting that even if they possess a proper subset of the powers of lower-level entities, this can still confer causal autonomy. They explore the idea that the power profile of a higher-level entity may be relevant to the production of effects, rather than individual powers in isolation. The speaker also introduces the concept of 'difference making' considerations to support the notion of weak emergence.

The speaker extends the discussion of emergence to ordinary objects, considering whether they too can be seen as metaphysically emergent. They suggest that the same strategies used for special science entities—strong and weak emergence—can be applied to ordinary objects, such as baseballs, by considering their distinct powers and the conditions under which they exist and persist.

This paragraph presents a debate over the application of emergence to the example of a car driven at different speeds, which have different sets of causal powers. The speaker discusses the challenges of understanding emergence in terms of distinct objects and causal powers, and how this relates to the broader debate on the nature of objects and their properties at different levels of description.

The speaker explores the connection between explanatory emergence, which deals with the ability to explain phenomena at different levels, and metaphysical emergence, which concerns the existence of distinct levels of reality. They discuss a case involving foxes and rabbits to illustrate how certain explanations may be more effective at the population level than at the individual level and consider whether this represents weak or strong emergence.

In this section, the speaker considers the implications of population-level emergence for metaphysical theories. They suggest that the powers associated with a population of organisms may represent a proper subset of the powers of the individual organisms, which could be an instance of weak emergence. The speaker also addresses the potential objections to this view, particularly from those who may not accept the fundamental role of causation in metaphysical explanations.

The speaker discusses the compatibility of upper-level and lower-level causation, using the example of a balloon filled with gas. They argue that there is no problem with upper-level properties, such as pressure and tension, causing effects without leading to over-determination, because there is fundamentally only one power or regularity at play, which is shared by both levels.

In the final paragraph, the speaker addresses how to individuate levels in metaphysical emergence, particularly how to determine which entities and properties belong to the physical level. They argue that even if an entity is a deductive consequence of lower-level laws, it may not belong to the physical level if it has lost information or degrees of freedom necessary for the operation of those laws, thus warranting its placement at a higher level.