Ending Institutional Corruption | Francis Fukuyama keynote

The final lecture of the Edmond J. Safra Lab on institutional corruption is introduced by Larry Lessig, the Center's Director. He welcomes Francis Fukuyama as the keynote speaker, highlighting Fukuyama's extensive work in political science and his influential books. Fukuyama's background and contributions to academia and public intellectual discourse are acknowledged, setting the stage for his closing address on institutional corruption.

Fukuyama delves into the topic of corruption, particularly its impact on developing countries, where it is recognized as a significant obstacle to development. He discusses the role of governance and the challenges faced in combating corruption, drawing from his experience as a consultant for organizations like the World Bank. Fukuyama emphasizes the historical and institutional factors that shape corruption levels and the importance of understanding these dynamics in the context of the United States.

Fukuyama outlines the three essential institutions of a well-functioning liberal democracy: the State, the rule of law, and democratic accountability. He explains the State's role in enforcing laws and delivering services, the rule of law as a constraint on power, and democratic accountability through multi-party elections. Fukuyama stresses the need for balance among these institutions to avoid political instability and ensure good governance.

The speaker discusses the transition from a patrimonial state, where political power is treated as private property, to a modern state that operates impersonally and treats citizens equally. Fukuyama argues that this transition is more challenging than moving from autocracy to democracy. He uses examples like Ukraine and Russia to illustrate the persistence of neo-patrimonialism and the struggle for a clear distinction between public and private interests in governance.

Fukuyama provides definitions and distinctions relevant to political science, including economic rents, good and bad rents, and the difference between patronage and clientelism. He argues that while some forms of rent-seeking are socially approved, such as patents and copyrights, others can be problematic. The biological roots of patronage are also explored, as well as the evolution of clientelism in democracies.

The speaker examines the historical development of American politics, from the early years following the constitution to the election of Andrew Jackson, which marked a shift towards mass political mobilization and the rise of clientelism. Fukuyama describes the spoils system and its impact on political appointments, highlighting the evolution of American political parties and the use of patronage to secure voter support.

Fukuyama compares the United States' experience with clientelism to that of other countries, particularly Greece and Italy, which have retained clientelistic politics. He discusses the impact of historical sequences in state development and democratization, suggesting that countries that democratized before consolidating a modern state, like Greece and Italy, have been unable to shed clientelism as effectively as those that developed strong states under autocratic conditions, such as Germany and Japan.

The speaker identifies the economic and social changes in the United States during the late 19th century, driven by the expansion of railroads and the transformation into an urban industrial society, as catalysts for political reform. He describes how these changes created new social groups with interests in breaking away from the old patronage system, leading to the progressive movement and the eventual establishment of a civil service based on meritocracy.

Fukuyama addresses the current state of courts and parties in the United States, critiquing the system of checks and balances for creating a veto-based democracy where interest groups can exert disproportionate influence. He discusses the challenges of collective action and the difficulty of implementing reforms due to the institutional structure of the U.S. government, which allows for numerous access points for interest groups to impact policy.

In the concluding paragraph, Fukuyama reflects on the global perception of American democracy, noting a shift from admiration to disappointment. He emphasizes the importance of the United States as a model for democratic governance and the need for continued efforts to address political decay and improve the functioning of democracy, both domestically and as an example for the rest of the world.